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et al.: Neumeier v. Kuehner

NEUMEIER v. KUEINER
31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972)

C

A domiciliary of Ontario, Canada, was killed
when the automobile in which he was riding, owned and driven
by a New York resident, collided with a train in Ontario. That
jurisdiction has a guest statute, and the primary question posed
by this appeal is whether in this action brought by the Ontario
passenger's estate, Ontario law should be applied and the New
York defendant permitted to rely on its guest statute as a defense.
The facts are quickly told. On May 7, 1969, Arthur Kuehner,
the defendant's intestate, a resident of Buffalo, drove his automobile from that city to Fort Erie in the Province of Ontario,
Canada, where he picked up Amie Neumeier, who lived in that
town with his wife and their children. Their trip was to take
them to Long Beach, also in Ontario, and back again to Neumeier's home in Fort Erie. However, at a railroad crossing in
the Town of Sherkston--on the way to Long Beach-the auto was
struck by a train of the defendant Canadian National Railway
Company. Both Kuehner and his guest-passenger were instantly
killed.
Neumeier's wife and administratrix, a citizen of Canada and
a domiciliary of Ontario, thereupon commenced this wrongful
death action in New York against both Kuehner's estate and the
Canadian National Railway Company. The defendant estate
pleaded, as an affirmative defense, the Ontario guest statute and
the defendant railway also interposed defenses in reliance upon it.
In substance, the statute provides that the owner or driver of a
motor vehicle is not liable for damages resulting from injury to,
or the death of, a guest-passenger unless he was guilty of gross
negligence (Highway Traffic Act of Province of Ontario [Ont. Rev.
Stat. (1960), ch. 1723, § 105, subd. [2], as amd. by Stat. of 1966,
ch. 64, § 20, subd. [2]). It is worth noting, at this point, that,
although our court originally considered that the sole purpose of
the Ontario statute was to protect Ontario defendants and their
insurers against collusive claims (see Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N Y 2d
473, 482-483), "Further research * * * has revealed the distinct
possibility that one purpose, and perhaps the only purpose, of the
statute was to protect owners and drivers against ungrateful guests."
(Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 Col. L. Rev. 548,
HIEF JUDGE FULD.
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558; see Trautman, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson: A Comment,
67 Col. L. Rev. 465, 469.)
The plaintiff, asserting that the Ontario statute "is not available * - in the present action", moved, pursuant to CPLR 3211
(subd. [b]), to dismiss the affirmative defenses pleaded. The court
at Special Term, holding the guest statute applicable, denied the
motions (63 Misc 2d 766) but, on appeal, a closely divided Appellate
Division reversed and directed dismissal of the defenses (37 A D 2d
70). It was the court's belief that such a result was dictated by
Tooker v. Lopez (24 N Y 2d 569).
In reaching that conclusion, the Appellate Division misread
our decision in the Tooker case-a not unnatural result in light of
the variant views expressed in the three separate opinions written on
behalf of the majority. It is important to bear in mind that in
Tooker, the guest-passenger and the host-driver were both domiciled
in New York, and our decision-that New York law was controlling
-was based upon, and limited to, that fact situation. Indeed, two
of the three judges who wrote for reversal-Judge KEATING (24
N Y 2d, at p. 580) and Judge BuRuK (at p. 591)-expressly noted
that the determination then being made left open the question
whether New York law would be applicable if the plaintiff passenger
happened to be a domiciliary of the very jurisdiction which had a
guest statute.' Thus, Tooker v. Lopez did no more than hold that,
when the passenger and driver are residents of the same jurisdiction
and the car is there registered and insured, its law, and not the law
of the place of accident, controls and determines the standard of
care which the host owes to his guest.
What significantly and effectively differentiates the present case
is the fact that, although the host was a domiciliary of New York,
the guest, for whose death recovery is sought, was domiciled in
Ontario, the place of accident and the very jurisdiction which had
enacted the statute designed to protect the host from liability for
ordinary negligence. It is clear that, although New York has a deep
interest in protecting its own residents, injured in a foreign state,
against unfair or anachronistic statutes of that state, it has no legitimate interest in ignoring the public policy of a foreign jurisdiction
-such as Ontario-and in protecting the plaintiff guest domiciled
1. In the other concurring opinion (24 N Y 2d, at p. 585), I wrote that in such a
case-where the passenger is a resident of the state having a guest statute--"the
applicable rule of decision will [normally] be that of the state where the accident
occurred".
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and injured there from legislation obviously addressed, at the very
least, to a resident riding in a vehicle traveling within its borders.
To distinguish Tooker on such a basis is not improperly discriminatory. It is quite true that, in applying the Ontario guest
statute to the Ontario-domiciled passenger, we, in a sense, extend
a right less generous than New York extends to a New York
passenger in a New York vehicle with New York insurance. That,
though, is not a consequence of invidious discrimination; it is,
rather, the result of the existence of disparate rules of law in jurisdictions that have diverse and important connections with the
litigants and the litigated issue.
The fact that insurance policies issued in this State on New
York-based vehicles cover liability, regardless of the place of the
accident (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 311, subd. 4), certainly does not
call for the application of internal New York law in this case. The
compulsory insurance requirement is designed to cover a car-owner's
liability, not create it; in other words, the applicable statute was
not intended to impose liability where none would otherwise exist.
This being so, we may not properly look to the New York insurance
requirement to dictate a choice-of-law rule which would invariably
impose liability. As Justice Moui= wrote in the course of his dissenting opinion below (37 A D 2d, at pp. 75-76), "The statute
[Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 311, subd. 4] does not purport to impose
liability where none would otherwise exist. We must observe that
Judge KEATiNG'S statement ([in Tooker, 24 N Y 2d, at] p. 577) that
the Legislature 'has evinced commendable concern not only for the
residents of this State, but residents of other States who may be
injured as a result of the activities of New York residents' was in
the context, not of proving that New York had a governmental
interest in overriding foreign rules of liability, but of demonstrating
that it was immaterial in that case that the driver and passenger,
while domiciliaries of New York, were attending college in Michigan. While New York may be a proper forum for actions involving
its own domiciliaries, regardless of where the accident happened, it
does not follow that we should apply New York law simply because
some may think it is a better rule, where doing so does not advance
any New York State interest, nor the interest of any New York
State domiciliary."
When, in Babcock v. Jackson (12 N Y 2d 473, supra), we rejected
the inexorable choice-of-law rule in personal injury cases because
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it failed to take account of underlying policy considerations, we
were willing to sacrifice the certainty provided by the old rule for
the more just, fair and practical result that may best be achieved by
giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which has the
greatest concern with, or interest in, the specific issue raised in the
litigation. (See, also, Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N Y 2d 569, 584 [concurring opn.], supra.) In consequence of the change effected-and
this was to be anticipated-our decisions in multi-state highway
accident cases, particularly in those involving guest-host controversies, have, it must be acknowledged, lacked consistency. This
stemmed, in part, from the circumstance that it is frequently difficult
to discover the purposes or policies underlying the relevant local
law rules of the respective jurisdictions involved. It is even more
difficult, assuming that these purposes or policies are found to
conflict, to determine on some principle basis which should be
given effect at the expense of the others.
The single all-encompassing rule which called, invariably, for
selection of the law of the place of injury was discarded, and wisely,
because it was too broad to prove satisfactory in application. There
is, however, no reason why choice-of-law rules, more narrow than
those previously devised, should not be successfully developed, in
order to assure a greater degree of predictability and uniformity,
on the basis of our present knowledge and experience. (See, e.g.,
Cavers, The Choice of Law Process, 121-122; Reese, Chief Judge
Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 Col. L. Rev. 548, 555, 561-562; Reese,
Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 Corn. L. Rev. 315, 321 et seq.;
Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. Rev. 641,
642, 646-647.) "The time has come," I wrote in Tooker (24 N Y 2d,
at p. 584), "to endeavor to minimize what some have characterized
as an ad hoc case-by-case approach by laying down guidelines, as
well as we can, for the solution of guest-host conflicts problems."
Babcock and its progeny enable us to formulate a set of basic
principles that may be profitably utilized, for they have helped us
uncover the underlying values and policies which are operative in
this area of the law. To quote again from the concurring opinion in
Tooker (p. 584), "Now that these values and policies have been
revealed, we may proceed to the next stage in the evolution of the
law-the formulation of a few rules of general applicability, promising a fair level of predictability." Although it was recognized that
no rule may be formulated to guarantee a satisfactory result in
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every case, the following principles were proposed as sound for
situations involving guest statutes in conflicts settings (24 N Y 2d,
at p. 585):
"1. When the guest-passenger, and the host-driver are
domiciled in the same state, and the car is there registered,
the law of that state should control and determine the
standard of care which the host owes to his guest.
"2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of
his domicile and that state does not cast him in liability for
that conduct, he should not be held liable by reason of the
fact that liability would be imposed upon him under the
tort law of the state of the victim's domicile. Conversely,
when the guest was injured in the state of his own domicile
and its law permits recovery, the driver who has come into
that state should not-in the absence of special circumstances
-be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defense.
"3. In other situations, when the passenger and the
driver are domiciled in different states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of
decision will be that of the state where the accident occurred
but not if it can be shown that displacing that normally
applicable rule will advance the relevant substantive law
purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multistate system or producing great uncertainty for litigants.
(Cf. Restatement, 2d, Conflict of Laws, P.O.D., pt. II,
§§ 146, 159 [later adopted and promulgated May 23, 1969].)".
The variant views expressed not only in Tooker but by Special
Term and the divided Appellate Division in this litigation underscore and confirm the need for these rules. Since the passenger
was domiciled in Ontario and the driver in New York, the present
case is covered by the third stated principle. The law to be applied
is that of the jurisdiction where the accident happened unless it
appears that "displacing [that] normally applicable rule will advance
the relevant substantive law purposes" of the jurisdictions involved.
Certainly, ignoring Ontario's policy requiring proof of gross negligence in a case which involves an Ontario-domiciled guest at the
expense of a New Yorker does not further the substantive law
purposes of New York. In point of fact, application of New York
law would result in the exposure of this State's domiciliaries to a
greater liability than that imposed upon resident users of Ontario's
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highways. Conversely, the failure to apply Ontario's law would
"impair"-to cull from the rule set out above--"the smooth working of the multi-state system [and] produce great uncertainty for
litigants" by sanctioning forum shopping and thereby allowing a
party to select a forum which could give him a larger recovery than
the court of his own domicile. In short, the plaintiff has failed to
show that this State's connection with the controversy was sufficient
to justify displacing the rule of lex loci delictus.
Professor Willis Reese, the Reporter for the current Conffict
of Laws Restatement, expressed approval of rules such as those
suggested above; they are, he wrote, "the sort of rules at which
the courts should aim" (Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of
Law, 71 Col. L. Rev. 548, 562; see, also, Reese, Choice of Law:
Rules or Approach, 57 Corn. L. Rev. 315, 321, 323, 328). 1 Indeed,
in discussing the present case following the determination at Special
Term that Ontario law should govern, he expressed the opinion that
any other result would have been highly unreasonable (71 Col. L.
Rev., at p. 563): "So far as the New York law was concerned, Judge
Keating had argued in Tooker v. Lopez that New York's motor
vehicle compulsory insurance law revealed a 'commendable concern'
not only for New York residents but also for non-residents injured
by New Yorkers. On this basis, it could perhaps be argued that New
York policy would be furthered by application of the New York
rule imposing upon the driver the duty of exercising ordinary
care for the protection of his guest. But could this argument
really be made with a straight face in support of an Ontario guest
picked up in Ontario and who enjoyed no similar protection under
Ontario Law? Was the New York rule really intended to be manna
for the entire world? One can well understand the relief with
which the trial judge seized upon Judge Fuld's third rule and
followed it by holding the Ontario statute applicable."
In each action, the Appellate Division's order should be reversed,
that of Special Term reinstated, without costs, and the questions
certified answered in the negative.
BRITEL,J. (concurring). I agree that there should be a reversal,
but would place the reversal on quite narrow grounds. It is undesirable to lay down prematurely major premises based on shifting
1. These rules have also been found acceptable by several other courts. (See, e.g.,
Arbuthnot v. Allbright, 35 A D 2d 315; Weinstein v. Abraham, 64 Misc 2d 76; Hancock
v. Holland, 63 Misc 2d 811; see, also, Pryor v. Swarner, 445 F. 2d 1272, 1275 et seq.
[2d Cir.]; Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A. 2d 610, 617 [Maine].)
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ideologies in the choice of law. True, Chief Judge FuLD in his concurring opinion in the Tooker case (Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N Y 2d
569, 583, at p. 584) took the view that there had already occurred
sufficient experience to lay down some rules of law which would
reduce the instability and uncertainty created by the recent departures from traditional lex loci delictus. This case, arising so soon
after, shows that the permutations in accident cases, especially
automobile accident cases, is disproof that the time has come.
Problems engendered by the new departures have not gone
unnoticed and they are not confined to the courts of this State
(Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev.
202, 214-220). They arise not merely because any new departure
of necessity creates problems, but much more because the departures
have been accompanied by an unprecedented competition of ideologies, largely of academic origin, to explain and reconstruct a
whole field of law, each purporting or aspiring to achieve a single
universal principle.
Babcock v. Jackson (12 N Y 2d 473), an eminently correctly
and justly decided case, applied the then current new doctrine
of grouping of contacts. Troubles arose only when the universality
of a single doctrine was assumed (Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N Y 2d
289; Dym v. Gordon, 16 N Y 2d 120). By the time of Miller v. Miller
(22 N Y 2d 12) and the Tooker case (24 N Y 2d 569, supra), the
new doctrine had been displaced by a still newer one, that of governmental interests developed most extensively by the late Brainerd
Currie, and the court was deeply engaged in probing the psychological motivation of legislatures of other States in enacting statutes restricting recoveries in tort cases. Now, evidently, it is suggested that
this State and other States may have less parochial concerns in enacting legislation restricting tort recoveries than had been believed only
a short time ago. The trouble this case has given the courts below
and now this court stems, it is suggested, more from a concern in
sorting out ideologies than in applying narrow rules of law in the
traditional common-law process (Juenger, op. cit., supra, at p. 283).
What the Babcock case (12 N Y 2d 473, supra) taught and
what modern day commentators largely agree is that lex loci delictus
is unsoundly applied if it is done indiscriminately and without
exception. It is still true, however, that the lex loci delictus is the
normal rule, as indeed Chief Judge FurD noted in the Tooker case
(24 N Y 2d 569, supra), to be rejected only when it is evident that
the situs of the accident is the least of the several factors or influences

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1973

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 8

Symposium
to which the accident may be attributed (for discussion, see dissenting
opn. in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N Y 2d, at pp. 505-506). Certain it is
that States are not concerned only with their own citizens or
residents. They are concerned with events that occur within their
territory, and are also concerned with the "stranger within the gates"
(Juenger, op. cit., supra, at pp. 209-210).
In this case, none would have ever assumed that New York
law should be applied just because one of the two defendants was a
New York resident and his automobile was New York insured,
except for the overbroad statements of Currie doctrine in the
Tooker case (24 N Y 2d 569, supra), stemming from one particular
school of academic thinking in the field of conflicts law (see the
concurring opn. by Judge BuRXE in the Tooker case, 24 N Y 2d, at
pp. 586-592, and for that matter, the dissenting opn. by Judge
BERGAN,

in this case).

Consequently, I agree that there should be a reversal and the
defenses allowed to stand. The conclusion, however, rests simply
on the proposition that plaintiff has failed by her allegations to
establish that the relationship to this State was sufficient to displace
the normal rule that the lex loci delictus should be applied, the
accident being associated with Ontario, from inception to tragic
termination, except for adventitious facts and where the lawsuit
was brought.
BERGAN, J. (dissenting). The doctrine of lex loci delictus, whatever its other shortcomings may be, including a somewhat abrasive
effect on inconsistent law of the forum, had at least the virtues of
certainty and reckonabiity.
But the operation of the guest statutes of other jurisdictions
worked out so differently-unjustly by New York standards-that
in a series of highly debatable and debated decisions from Babcock v.
Jackson (12 N Y 2d 473 [1963]) to Tooker v. Lopez (24 N Y 2d 569
[1969]) this court refused to follow the rule of lex loci delictus in
special situations and applied New York law in New York litigation
to motor vehicle torts occurring in other jurisdictions.
The rationale of departure from the settled rule was that New
York had a greater "concern" or "interest" in the controversy or
the parties; or had closer "contacts" than the jurisdiction of the
situs of the accident. See Miller v. Miller (22 N Y 2d 12); Farberv.
Smolack (20 N Y 2d 198), and Macey v. Rozbicki (18 N Y 2d 289).
The decision in Dym v. Gordon (16 N Y 2d 120) went the other way.
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The direction taken and justified by the rationale of "interest" or
"contact", however, necessarily started with the court's preference
for the local rule and a belief in its greater justice.
There is a difference of fundamental character between justifying a departure from lex loci delictus because the court will
not, as a matter of policy, permit a New York owner of a car
licensed and insured in New York to escape a liability that would
be imposed on him here; and a departure based on the fact a
New York resident makes the claim for injury. The first ground
of departure is justifiable as sound policy; the second is justifiable only if one is willing to treat the rights of a stranger permitted
to sue in New York differently from the way a resident is treated.
Neither because of "interest" nor "contact" nor any other defensible
ground is it proper to say in a court of law that the rights of one man
whose suit is accepted shall be adjudged differently on the merits
on the basis of where he happens to live.
This crunch in the rule announced in Babcock (12 N Y 2d
473, supra) was inevitable as it worked its way into the practice.
And the difficulty was recognized in Tooker (24 N Y 2d 569,
supra). Although Tooker, unlike the present case, involved a New
York plaintiff and thus was similar to Babcock and the cases which
had followed Babcock, the opinion of the court laid it down that
the New York owner of a car insured in New York would not be
permitted to escape liability through the guest statute of Michigan
and that this was the main ground of decision. The court in Tooker
said (p. 575): "This purpose [of a statute of another jurisdiction
establishing higher standards for the recovery of guests in vehicles]
can never be vindicated when the insurer is a New York carrier and
the defendant is sued in the courts of this State. Under such circumstances, the jurisdiction enacting such a guest statute has
absolutely no interest in the application of its law."
The decision was 4-to-3; but a majority of the Judges expressly
subscribed to the opinion by Judge KEATInG even though Chief
Judge FuLD and Judge BuRKEc stated additional grounds of concurrence. The quoted statement of policy in the Tooker opinion,
which was the court's statement and not the view of an individual
Judge has the normal binding effect of such an opinion.
Reading these words of the opinion of the court the Bar would
reasonably anticipate that the more basic and justifiable ground
for refusing a New York vehicle the differential benefit of a foreign
statute would be applied in future. Such a rule would offer more
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in the way of reckonability and predictability than the elusive
grouping of "contacts" or "interests".
Hence the Appellate Division was justified in reading Tooker
(24 N Y 2d 569, supra) to dismiss the asserted defense in this action.
What the court is deciding today is that although it will prevent a
New York car owner from asserting the defense of a protective
foreign statute when a New York resident in whose rights it has an
"interest" sues; it has no such "interest" when it accepts the suit
in New York of a nonresident. This is an inadmissible distinction.
The order should be affirmed.
Judges BuRKE, ScILEPI and GIBSON concur with Chief Judge
FULD; Judge BIREamL concurs in a separate opinion in which Judge
JASEN concurs; Judge BERGAN dissents and votes to affirm in an
opinion.
Orders reversed, etc.
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